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THE NEW FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW
JOSEPH B. ROBIsoN*
During 1959, the list of thirteen states having fully enforceable fair
employment laws was increased by three. Two states, California and Ohio,
were added by the prosaic method of adopting appropriate legislation. The
third, Alaska, entered by the more romantic process of being admitted as
a state with a fair employment law already in effect.
In adopting fair employment laws this year, Ohio and California
followed a well-trod path. It is notable, however, that while California
adopted a carefully circumscribed bill, adhering closely to the original law
enacted in New York in 1945, the new Ohio law is regarded by support-
ers of such legislation as the most advanced of any fair employment law
now in effect.
Reserving details for later, the new law1 adds sections 4112.01 to
4112.08 and 4112.99 of the Revised Code. Various forms of discrimi-
nation in employment because of "race, color, religion, national origin
or ancestry" are declared to be "unlawful discriminatory practices." A
five-man Ohio Civil Rights Commission is established to administer the
law. When charges are filed with the Commission alleging the occur-
rence of an unlawful discriminatory practice, the Commission is empow-
ered to make an investigation. Where it finds evidence of an unlawful
practice, it must attempt to settle the matter by conciliation. Where this
fails, the Commission may hold a public hearing and issue a decision. If
it finds that an unlawful practice has occurred, it may issue a remedial
order which can be enforced through specified court proceedings.
ORIGIN OF THE LAW
Two streams of legislation converged to produce this new detailed
and comprehensive anti-discrimination law-administrative legislation
adopted by the federal government and the various states and the series of
non-administrative anti-discrimination laws adopted over the years in Ohio.
The Administrative Enforcement Process
The administrative method of enforcement had slow beginnings in
*Assistant Director, Commission on Law and Social Action, American Jewish
Congress, Member of New York State and United States Supreme Court Bars.
1 Amended Senate Bill No. 10 was passed on April 20, 1959 and approved
by the Governor on April 29.
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the Nineteenth Century, increased in popularity in the first few decades of
the Twentieth Century and achieved widespread application during the
New Deal period of the Thirties.2 These laws were a response to the in-
creasing realization that criminal sanctions were not precise enough to deal
with certain complex types of misconduct. Administrative enforcement
was adopted in order to obtain specialized handling of both the determina-
tion of guilt and the selection of remedies.3 Administrative agencies were
established to perform these functions, with the courts held in reserve to
review the fairness of the administrative action and to enforce compliance
with agency orders.
The first well-supported move to apply this technique to the area of
racial discrimination was directed at the United States Congress rather
than the state legislatures. In June, 1941, vigorous protest was heard
from Negro and other civil rights organizations against the exclusion of
minorities from employment in the growing war industries. President
Roosevelt responded by appointing the wartime Fair Employment Prac-
tices Committee.' The Executive Order establishing that Committee5 di-
rected the inclusion of clauses in all government contracts barring employ-
ment discrimination by contractors. The FEPC was directed to police en-
forcement of those provisions and was empowered to use many of the pro-
cedures typical of administrative agencies. However, it was denied the
power to issue enforceable orders.' In the following years, a number of
organizations joined to form the National Council for a Permanent FEPC
which supported Federal fair employment legislation. 7 The bills introduced
at this time drew heavily on the earlier administrative legislation and par-
ticularly on the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.8 However, these
and later efforts to obtain Federal legislation were unable to overcome the
barriers raised by the use of the filibuster and other procedural devices by
the Southern bloc in Congress.9
2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-7 (1951); LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 1-22 (1938).
3 GELLHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 3-6 (1954).
4 RUCHAMES, RACE, JOBS AND PoLmcs, THE STORY OF FEPC 11-21 (1953);
Maslow, FEPC-A Case Study in Parliamentary Maneuver, 13 U. CHI. L. REV.
407, 40S-9 (1946).
5 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
6For descriptions of the operations of the wartime FEPC, see Ross, ALL
MANNER OF MEN (1948); RUCHAMES, op. cit. supra note 4; FAIR EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICE COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, (1945) ; FINAL REPORT, (1947) ; Murray, The
Right to Equal Opportunity in Employment, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 388, 408-416 (1945).
7 KESSELMAN, THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF FEPC 25-46 (1948); RUcHAMES, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 199-200.
849 Stat. 449 (1935).
9The history of the fight in 1944, 1945 and 1946 is described in Maslow,
op. cit. supra note 4. For subsequent Congressional battles see Maslow and Robi-
son, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CHI. L.
REV. 363, 396-397 (1953). See generally Hunt, The Proposed Fair Employment
Practice Act; Facts and Fallacies, 32 VA. L. REV. 1 (1945).
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Meanwhile, however, efforts were begun to obtain fair employment
legislation in the states. The first such law was enacted in New York in
1945,1" following extensive hearings before a legislative commission
which found that discrimination existed, that it was injurious to the inter-
ests of the state and its people, that it could be curbed by legislation and
that this could be done best by an administrative agency charged with the
duty of using methods of conciliation and education but with full enforce-
ment powers to be used where necessary." Similar statutes were subse-
quently enacted in New Jersey in 1945,12 Massachusetts in 1946,"3 Con-
necticut in 1947,14 New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washington
in 1949,"5 Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania in 1955,"6 Colorado
and Wisconsin in 1957,17 and California and Ohio in 1959.18 Alaska
adopted a fair employment law in 1953 when it was still a territory.' 9
Enforceable fair employment laws now cover all non-Southern industrial
states except Indiana. These states include 49.73 per cent of the population
of the country, 25.91 per cent of the non-white population and 82.29 per
cent of the Jewish population.20
10 N. Y. LAWS, c. 118 § 1 (1945), which, as amended, is now N. Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 290-301 (1951).
1 1 
REPORT, NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION,
Leg. Doc. No. 6 (1945). For other studies of the existence of employment discrimi-
nation see authorities cited in MASLOW AND ROBISON, op. cit. supra, note 9, at n. 396.
12N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 18:25-1 to -28 (Supp. 1958).
13 MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1958).
14 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-122 to -128 (1958), as amended, Pub. Act. No. 145
(1959).
15 N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-4-1 to -14 (Supp. 1957), as amended by L. 1959,
C. 296; ORE. REv. STAT. 659.010 - .115 (Supp. 1957), 659.990 as amended by L.
1959, C. 584; R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-5-1 to -39 (Supp. 1958); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 49.60.010 -.310 (Supp. 1957), as amended by L. 1959, C. 68.
16 MICH. ComP. LAWS §§ 423,301-311 (Supp. 1956); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 363.01 -. 13 (Supp. 1958) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (Supp. 1958).
17 COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1 to -8 (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 111.31 -. 37 (Supp. 1959), as amended by L. 1959, C. 149.
1 Senate Bill No. 10, supra note 1; CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1410-32 (1959).
19 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 43-5-1 to -10 (Supp. 1957). So-called "vol-
untary" fair employment laws, which condemn employment discrimination but
without enforcement powers, were enacted in Indiana (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-
2301 to -2306 (Supp. 1957)); Wisconsin, in 1945 (supra note 17) ; Colorado, in
1941 (supra note 17) and Kansas in 1953 (KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 44-1001 to -1008
(Supp. 1957) ). As already noted, enforcement provisions were adopted in Colorado
and Wisconsin in 1947.
2 0 AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, A REPORT ON STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
AGENCIES AND THE LAWS THEY ADMINISTER (Mimeo, 1959). Fair employment
ordinances have also been adopted in a number of cities. Few of these, however,
are fully enforceable by the administrative process because of home-rule limita-
tions. See Elson and Schanfield, Local Regulation of Discriminatory Employment
Practices, 56 YALE L. J. 431 (1947) ; The New Pittsburgh Fair Employment Prac-
tices Ordinance, 14 U. PIrr. L. REv. 604, 606-09 (1953). With the enactment of the
California and Ohio Laws this year, virtually all the effective municipal fair em-
ployment laws are now in areas also covered by state laws.
FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW
Success of the administratively enforced fair employment law has
prompted use of the same technique against other forms of racial discrim-
ination. A number of states have broadened the jurisdiction of agencies
originally empowered to act only in the area of employment. Starting with
New Jersey in 1948, eight states have amended their fair employment
laws by directing their commissions to apply the same procedures to en-
force already existing laws against discrimination in hotels, restaurants,
theatres and other places of public accommodation."' Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Oregon and Washington have further empowered their agencies
to deal with discrimination in education,22 and New York has given par-
allel powers to its education authorities.2" Six states have applied the same
technique to housing operated or assisted by the state or federal govern-
ments,24 and this year four states adopted laws applying agency procedures
to the general housing market.25 Efforts have been made to add similar
broadening amendments to the fair employment laws of other states, and
this may be expected in Ohio in the years ahead.
It remains only to note that five of the sixteen agencies enforcing
fair employment laws are also charged with preventing employment dis-
crimination based on age.2
6
Prior Ohio Anti-Discrimination Laws
The road to the 1959 fair employment law in Ohio was paved not
only by success of similar laws elsewhere but also by a number of more re-
stricted anti-bias laws and constitutional provisions in this state dating back
to 1802. In that year, the state adopted a constitution containing a prohi-
bition of religious tests for public office.2 Forty-nine years later, it ap-
proved a constitutional provision barring religious tests for witnesses. 28 In
1884, it followed the trend in the Northern states by adopting a "civil
rights law," that is, a law prohibiting discrimination in places of public
21 COLO. RV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1-1 to -5, 25-2-1 to -5, and 25-3-1 to -6 (Supp.
1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-35, -36 (1958), as amended by L. 1959, Pub. Acts
Nos. III and 113; MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (Supp. 1958); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§ 30.670 -.680 (Supp. 1957) ; R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 11-24-1 to -6 (Supp.
1958); New Jersey, New York and Washington laws cited' supra in notes 12, 10
and 15, respectively.
22 MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 151C, §§ 1-5 (Supp. 1958) ; ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 345.240,
.250 (Supp. 1957) and the New Jersey and Washington statutes cited sutra in
notes 12 and 15, respectively.
23 N. Y. EDUC. LAW § 313.
24 MASS. ANN. LAWs C. 151B, §§ 1-10 (Supp. 1958), amended by L. 1959, C.
239 and the Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island and Washington
laws cited supra in notes 21, 12, 10, 21 and 15, respectively.
25 Colo. H. B. No. 259, approved April 10, 1959, and the Connecticut, Massa-
chusetts and Oregon laws cited supra in notes 21, 24, and 15, respectively.
26 Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin fair
employment laws, cited supra notes 14, 13, 10, 16 and 17, respectively.
27 OHIO CONST. art. I, § 7.
2 8 Ibid.
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accommodation, 29 enforceable by civil or criminal penalties. In the same
year, disqualification from jury service because of race or color was for-
bidden."0 In 1889 and 1893, laws were passed prohibiting discrimination
between white and colored persons in issuing life insurance policies.3 In
1915, the legislature forbade discrimination because of religion in civil
service employment.32 Finally, in 1935, discrimination in public works em-
ployment because of race, creed or color was banned.3 3
Mere examination of these constitutional and statutory provisions is
no guide to how well they have worked. The meagerness of case annota-
tions in the Code suggests that they have not been vigorously enforced.3 4
Studies of laws dealing with places of public accommodation have gen-
erally come to the conclusion that, as long as they are enforced only by
prosecutions or suits for civil penalties, they can be and are openly violated
on a large scale.35 Indeed, that is the reason why, as already noted, eight
states have placed enforcement of these laws under the jurisdiction of their
administrative enforcement agencies.
We turn now to a consideration of the specific terms of the new
Ohio law.
THE TERMS OF THE ACT
Section 4112.01 contains conventional definitions of such terms as
"person," "labor organization" and "employment agency." 36 The defini-
tion of "employee" in paragraph (C) includes domestic servants, as is cus-
tomary. The definition of "employer" in paragraph (B) includes the state
but excludes companies employing less than four or more persons in Ohio.
Such exemptions for small employers are contained in all but two of the
fair employment laws." Four is the lowest minimum in any of these stat-
29 OHIo REV. CODE § 2901.35 (1953). For a description of the laws in the
various states, see Maslow and Robison, rupra note 9, at 405, and authorities there
cited.
3 0 OHIO REV. CODE § 2313.47 (1953).
3 1 OHIo REV. CODE §§ 3911.16, 3911.18 (1953).
32 OHIO REV. CODE § 143.26 (1953).
33 OHIO REV. CODE § 153.59 (1953). Similar limited, non-administrative, pro-
hibitions of discrimination have been adopted in many other states. AMERICAN
JEWISH CONGRESS, CHECK LIST OF STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1953).
34 No case annotations appear in the OHIO REV. CODE to §§ 153.59, 2313.47,
3911.16 or 3911.18. The annotations to § 143.26 deal with aspects unrelated to
racial discrimination. Sec. 2901.35, the 1884 Civil Rights Law, has been involved
in 18 reported cases.
35 Maslow and Robison, supra note 9, at 406, and authorities there cited.
36Earlier fair employment laws contain legislative findings concerning the
existence and consequences of discrimination. These findings are designed to
establish the reasonableness of the statute under the police power. See, e.g., N. Y.
EXEC. LAW § 290. No such findings are contained in the Ohio law. Since, as noted
infra, there is little likelihood of a successful challenge to the constitutionality of
the law, the omission of these customary provisions is not likely to have any
effect.
37 The exceptions are Wisconsin and Alaska. The Wisconsin statute, while
[Vol. 20
FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW
utes. The highest, twelve, is found in the Pennsylvania law.
Section 4112.02 establishes the conduct that constitutes "unlawful
discriminatory practices." Paragraph (A) contains a conventional prohibi-
tion of discrimination by employers in hiring and discharging and in the
terms or conditions of employment.
Paragraph (B) applies to employment agencies, barring discrimina-
tion in referring or classifying applicants. It also bars complying with a dis-
criminatory order from employers. Only three other states have this latter
provision, Colorado, Minnesota and Rhode Island.
Paragraph (C) makes it unlawful for any union to limit or classify
membership discriminatorily or to discriminate in any way that affects em-
ployment status.
Paragraph (D) bars discrimination by employers, unions or joint
labor management committees in admission to, or employment in, appren-
tice training programs. This provision is unique to the Ohio law. It is de-
signed to deal with a problem that has been quite troublesome under other
fair employment laws.
Paragraph (E) makes it unlawful for an employer, employment
agency or union to ask discriminatory questions of applicants, to keep a rec-
ord of an applicant's origin, to use discriminatory application forms, to
publish discriminatory advertisements, to apply a quota system or to use an
agency that discriminates. Similar provisions dealing with discriminatory
questions, advertising and records appear in almost all other fair employ-
ment laws, but the Ohio provision is cast in a detailed form found in only
three other states, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. This para-
graph is introduced by the clause, "except where based on a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification certified in advance by the commission." This gives
religious institutions a very limited exemption from the operation of the
act. Most other fair employment laws give religious non-profit groups a
complete exemption, thus permitting them not only to favor their own
communicants but also, if they choose, to discriminate on the basis of race.
The clause in the Ohio act permits at most preference for a group's fol-
lowers and is presumably limited to those jobs in which religious belief or
knowledge is needed for the work to be done."
belonging in the category of administrative enforcement laws, is less detailed than
such statutes usually are. The Alaska law, originally enacted in 1953 with a ten-
employee minimum, was amended in 1957 to eliminate this provision.
3s An absolute exemption for religious and other non-profit organizations
appears in the fair employment laws of Alaska, California, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wis-
consin. The Colorado and Washington laws have complete exemptions for religi-
ous non-profit groups only. The Minnesota law gives an exemption to religious
and fraternal societies as to questions based on religion where religion is a bona
fide occupational requirement. The Connecticut and Michigan laws, like that of
Ohio, contain only the "bona fide occupational qualification" clause. It should also
be noted that the clause in the Ohio statute is attached only to the paragraph
dealing with discriminatory questions, advertisements and the like, and not to
19591
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Paragraph (F) prohibits discriminatory "situations wanted" adver-
tisements, a provision in effect in two other states, Michigan and Pennsyl-
vania.
Paragraph (G) is the customary prohibition of discrimination against
any person who has participated in proceedings under the act.39.
Paragraph (H) is the customary prohibition of aiding and abetting
unfair discriminatory practices by others.
Section 4112.03 creates the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, consist-
ing of five members to be appointed by the governor, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for overlapping terms of five years. Members are
to receive a salary of $5,000 a year.4"
Section 4112.04(4) specifies the duties of the Commission, includ-
ing such customary items as maintaining offices, adopting rules and regu-
lations, conducting educational programs and filing annual reports. Para-
graph (2) of this section directs the appointment of an executive director
at an annual salary of $12,000. Other staff personnel are to be appointed
subject to the Civil Service Laws.
Paragraph (7) of this section directs the Commission to make sur-
veys of discrimination, and paragraph (8) requires the Commission to sub-
mit reports on such surveys with its recommendations for legislative or
other remedial action. Since these provisions are not limited to discrimina-
tion in employment, they could facilitate gradual enlargement of the Com-
mission's jurisdiction, paralleling similar developments in other states al-
ready described.
Section 4112.04(B) grants the Commission conventional powers to
hold hearings, subpoena witnesses, create advisory councils and issue publi-
cations. Failure to comply with a Commission subpoena constitutes a con-
tempt punishable, on application of the Commission, by the Common
Pleas Court.
Section 4112.05 specifies the requirements for proceedings before the
Commission. Under paragraph (A), the Commission is directed to prevent
the basic prohibitions, in paragraphs (A), (B) and (C) of discrimination by
employers, employment agencies and unions. Strictly construed, this would bar
discrimination by religious institutions in selecting their employees. However, the
Commission and the courts might well view the clause in paragraph (E) as an
indication of legislative intent to permit such discrimination.
39 This can be traced back to a similar provision in the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (4).
40 In this respect, Ohio follows a middle ground. Of the other states, four
provide no payment to their commissioners except for expenses (Colorado, Con-
necticut, Minnesota and New Mexico) ; four pay the commissioners per diem
ranging from fifteen to fifty dollars (California, Michigan, Pennsylvania and
Washington); two, like Ohio, pay low salaries, implying that the commissioners
are not expected to work full time (Massachusetts and Rhode Island), and only
one, New York, pays full-scale salaries. The other four states entrust enforcement




unlawful discriminatory practices provided that it must use "informal
methods of persuasion and conciliation" before instituting a "formal
hearing."
Under paragraph (B), proceedings are started when any person
charges that an unlawful practice has occurred or when the Commission,
on its own initiative, starts an investigation. The power to initiate proceed-
ings is specifically given to seven other commissions, and impliedly to two
others. 1 Moreover, by providing for the filing of a complaint by any
"person" the statute omits the common requirement that actions can be
started only by the "aggrieved" individual. No other state has so broad a
provision.42 It will make it possible for interested civic groups to initiate
enforcement proceedings in areas where the nature of the discrimination
practice tends to inhibit the filing of complaints. This may happen where
the job in question requires lengthy training and the discriminatory prac-
tice discourages minority group individuals from qualifying themselves as
'"persons aggrieved."
After a charge is filed, the Commission investigates and, if it finds
it probable that unlawful practices have occurred, it seeks to eliminate
them by informal methods. Where these methods fail, the Commission
issues a formal complaint with a notice of hearing to be held before the
Commission, a commissioner or a hearing examiner. These provisions are
somewhat more carefully spelled out than in most of the earlier fair em-
ployment laws but contain no marked departures. The same may be said
of the provisions in paragraph (C), dealing with amendments to the com-
plaint and the answer, paragraph (D) dealing with intervention and para-
graph (F) which empowers the Commission to take additional testimony.
Paragraph (E) frees the Commission from the common law rules
of evidence, a provision contained in eight other laws.43 It also expressly
allows the use of statistical evidence to prove discrimination, a provision
contained in only one other law.44
41 The power to initiate complaints is given to the commissions in Colorado,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Wash-
ington. It appears to be given to the commissions in California and Wisconsin. It
is withheld in Alabama, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and
Oregon. A number of statutes also empower such officials as the Attorney Gen-
eral to file complaints.
42 Most of the statutes provide that complaints may be filed by a person "ag-
grieved" by an unlawful practice. The Michigan statute is unclear on this, pro-
viding at one point that complaints may be filed by "aggrieved" persons and, at
another, that charges may be made by any "individual." The Rhode Island statute
specifically permits civil rights organizations to file complaints. The Ohio pro-
vision, patterned on the corresponding provision of the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act, supra note 39 (now 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1956)), eliminates all
question about the standing of the individual, organization or other body at-
tempting to set the Commission's procedures in motion.
43 Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
4 4 Rhode Island.
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Under paragraph (G), if the Commission finds that the "respond-
ent" (the term applied to the employer, employment agency, union or
other agency charged with unlawful practices) has violated the Act, it
issues findings of fact and an order requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from its practices and to take such affirmative action, including re-
instatement with back pay, as the Commission finds will effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act. Under paragraph (H), the Commission is required to
issue findings of fact and a formal dismissal of the complaint if it does not
uphold the charges.
Section 4112.06 deals with court review and enforcement of Com-
mission orders. Under paragraph (A), any party to a proceeding, includ-
ing the Commission, may seek judicial review in the Common Pleas Court.
There is an express provision permitting review of a refusal by the Com-
mission to issue a complaint. Such provisions are contained in three other
laws.45 They are designed to meet a problem that has arisen under earlier
laws when a commission, or a single commissioner, decides on the basis of
the informal investigation that there is no probable cause to believe that
an unlawful practice has occurred and therefore dismisses the complaint
without holding a formal hearing. Unless some form of judicial review
of such a ruling is provided, the decision becomes final even if it is based
on the commission's interpretation of the law. While an administrative
agency sbould be given wide latitude in deciding whether to proceed with
a case, the review provided in the Ohio law seems desirable. It permits at
least limited judicial review of complaint dismissals to correct legal errors
and also to prevent arbitrary action.4 6
Under paragraph (B), the court reviews the case and may issue an
order enforcing, modifying, or setting aside the Commission's order.
Paragraph (C) has the customary administrative law provision that
objections not urged before the Commission shall not be considered by the
court except in extraordinary circumstances.
Under paragraph (D), the court may grant a request for the admis-
sion of additional evidence that could not reasonably have been produced
before the Commission. While other fair employment laws as well as
other administrative statutes usually provide that the court shall direct that
such additional evidence be heard by the administrative agency, the Ohio
statute requires the court to hear it itself. Furthermore, under paragraph
(E), the court passes on the Commission's order on the basis of the record,
45 Michigan, New Mexico and Rhode Island.
46 Of the twelve other statutes, two appear to show a legislative intent to
allow judicial review only of orders issued after hearings (Alaska and Wash-
ington) and one is unclear (Colorado). In the remaining states, in which the
statute is silent on this point, general statutes or judicial principles may permit
another form of judicial review. Thus, such review has been permitted in New
York under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act. Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.
2d 238, 149 N.E. 2d 882 (1958).
[Vol. 20
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including the additional evidence. This is a departure not only from con-
ventional practice but also from the theory underlying administrative stat-
utes. Where the court concludes that additional evidence should be con-
sidered, the concept of administrative expertese suggests that it should be
considered and the order reconsidered by the agency rather than the court.
However, such requests are rarely made and more rarely granted so that
this departure is not likely to be widely tested.
Paragraph (E) also contains the conventional provision that the find-
ings of fact of the Commission shall be conclusive "if supported by sub-
stantial evidence."
Paragraph (F) gives the court exclusive jurisdiction subject to ap-
pellate review and provides that "violation of the court's order shall be
punishable as contempt."
Paragraph (G) dispenses with the necessity of printing a transcript
of the record.
Paragraph (H) provides that if no proceeding to obtain judicial re-
view is instituted within 30 days from service of the Commission's order,
the Commission may obtain an enforcement decree from the court upon
showing that the respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion and the court. This provision is found in four other statutes.4
Section 4112.07 requires all persons subject to the Act to post notices
approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts of the Act and other
relevant information.
Section 4112.08 requires liberal construction of the Act and further
provides that it shall not be deemed to repeal any pre-existing law dealing
with discrimination.
Section 4112.99 provides that whoever violates the notice-posting pro-
vision of Section 4112.07 shall be fined $100 to $500. This is the only
criminal provision in the statute.
IMPLEMENTATION
One fairly safe prediction, based on experience in other states, is
that the new fair employment law will not keep many lawyers busy. A
striking feature of these laws, in sharp contrast with the labor laws on
which they were modelled, is that they do not generate litigation. Figures
supplied by agencies in operation prior to this year show that the combined
latest annual case load in twelve states came to only 2,333 complaints.48
In very few of these cases was the complaintant represented by an at-
torney.
Even more striking is the fact that, since enactment of the first laws
47 Colorado, Michigan, New Mexico and Rhode Island.
48 Information supplied to the author. This figure includes cases involving
discrimination in education, public accommodations and publicly assisted housing,
as well as employment.
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in 1945, no more than at most two dozen cases have reached the stage of
a formal hearing, all the rest having been settled at the informal concilia-
tion stage.4" Less than a dozen cases have reached the courts."
This does not mean that no difficult questions of interpretation
have arisen. The annual reports of the various commissions reveal
the knotty problems they have struggled with and the principles they have
established. Since there have been few formal decisions, these reports pro-
vide the principal source of case law authority. Generally, the commissions
have tended to follow their own precedents, adhering to prior rulings ex-
cept where moved to review them for the same reasons that courts oc-
casionally reverse themselves. On many of the problems that the new Ohio
Commission will face, it will be able to draw on the experience of its older,
sister agencies.5
1
Is the new fair employment law constitutional? Strangely enough,
there is no square authority on this question. None of the existing laws
has been put to the test. As already noted, the few cases involving these
laws that have reached the courts have not raised the issue of constitution-
ality. The most one can say is that the reviewing courts have assumed
that the laws are valid.
Nevertheless, the 1945 decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi52 affords a solid basis for assuming
that these laws are safe against constitutional attack. The Court there re-
jected a specific challenge to the constitutionality of a New York statute
prohibiting discrimination by unions.5 3 It was claimed by an association of
railway workers that the law was a denial of due process in that it inter-
fered with the union's right to select its own members and further that
49 For example, the New York State Commission has held only five formal
hearings since its establishment in 1945.
50The annotations under the various statutes reveal only five cases, all in
Connecticut and New York. These are International Bhd. of Elec. Workers',
Local 35 v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140 Conn. 537, 102 A. 2d 291 (1953)
(upholding on the facts a finding of discrimination by a union and passing on
various procedural questions) ; Draper v. Clark Dairy, 17 Conn. Sup. 93 (1950)
(similar decision as to employer); Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d
581 (1954) (finding against employment agency upheld on facts and various
procedural matters considered) ; Jeanpierre v. Arbury, supra note 46 (holding that
dismissal of complaint is reviewable in court but that dismissal here was not
arbitrary) ; Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1954), aff'd 285 App.
Div. 886, 139 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1955) (upholding notice posting requirement). The
author is informed that three other cases have reached the courts in New York
in which the decisions were not officially reported. An additional case not yet
reported officially is American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 142 N.Y.L.J. (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) 3, col. 8, (1959) (reversing dismissal of a complaint by the Commission).
51The various state and municipal anti-discrimination agencies have formed
the Conference of Commissions Against Discrimination which meets once a year
to exchange information on common problems.
52 326 U.S. 89 (1954).
53 N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 43.
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it abridged the association's property rights and liberty of contract. The
court said:
We have here a prohibition of discrimination in membership or
union services on account of race, creed or color. A judicial
determination that such legislation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in
that amendment which was adopted to prevent state legislation
designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or
color. We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a
state cannot protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis
of race, color or creed by an organization, functioning under
the protection of the state, which holds itself out to represent
the general business needs of employees.
4
Even before this case was decided, the courts had had an opportunity
to pass on the laws enacted in many states prohibiting discrimination in
places of public accommodation. In at least eleven states these laws have
been upheld. 5 In 1953, a case reached the United States Supreme Court
under a similar law in the District of Columbia. 6 While the question of
constitutionality was not raised, the Court commented:
And certainly so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned
there is no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race in the use of facilities serving a public
function is within the police power of the states."
It is not surprising to find that writers on the subject generally agree
that fair employment legislation is constitutional. 5
In endeavoring to obtain compliance with the restraints placed upon
54 326 U.S. at 93-94.
rl Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 Pac. 55 (1920); Darius v. Apos-
tolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1919) ; Baylies v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E.
595 (1889) ; Picket v. Kuchan, 323 Ill. 138, 155 N.E. 667 (1926) ; Fruchey v.
Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 N.E. 146 (1895) ; Brown v. J. H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa
89, 123 N.V. 231, 124 N.,. 901 (1909); DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (1875),
reqjd on other grounds, 95 U.S. 487 (1878); Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46
N.V. 718 (1890) ; Rhone v. Loomis, 74 Minn. 200 (1898); Nebraska Messenger
v. State, 25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889) ; People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418 (1888)
Commission v. George, 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 412 (1915).
50 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
57346 U.S. at 109. The Supreme Court had earlier assumed the constitution-
ality of such a statute in Bob Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948),
where it affirmed a conviction under the Michigan Civil Rights Act. In Christie
v. 46th Street Theatre Corp. 265 App. Div. 255, aft'd 292 N.Y. 520, 643 (1943),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 710 (1944), the court refused to disturb a New York deci-
sion upholding the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Law § 40-b, on the au-
thority of People v. King, supra note 55.
8 Waite, Constitutionality of the Propsed Minnesota Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act, 32 MINN. L. Rav. 349 (1948) ; The New York State Commission Against
Discrimination: A New Technique for an Old Problem, 56 YALE L.J. 837, 846-8
(1947); 14 U. Pirr. L. REv., supra note 20, at 609-11; Pennsylvania Fair Em-
ployment Practice Act., 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 438, 4424 (1956).
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industry by this new law, the Commission will not be able to rely entirely
on the processing of complaints." In fact, it is plain that one cannot ex-
pect complaints to be filed against every employer who discriminates. Un-
less there is a broad movement among employers toward compliance with
the law, merely because it is the law, discrimination will continue to be
widespread for a long time.
The extent to which such a movement has occurred in the older
FEPC states is not really known. Charges that job bias continues in spe-
cific industries are frequently aired in the press, while areas of voluntary
compliance are likely to go unnoticed. Perhaps the fact that minority
groups continue to seek fair employment legislation is sufficient proof that
they are satisfied that it can and does result in substantial concrete im-
provement in their lot.
The Ohio law, like most of its predecessors, gives the Commission
a broad mandate to engage in educational campaigns and to work with
local and state-wide advisory councils both to promote compliance by em-
ployers and to encourage minority group workers to make use of the new
opportunities that the law is designed to create. But changing patterns of
conduct by generalized educational campaigns is slow work. There is rea-
son to believe that expeditious processing of a few complaints, culminating
in placing non-white workers in jobs they had been refused, accomplishes
more education than volumes of leaflets, advertisements and radio scripts.
Educational campaigns tend to blur the essential fact that the legislature
has made employment discrimination illegal.
There is a widely held view among civil rights groups that the vari-
ous state commissions have tended to be too cautious up to now in han-
dling cases, that they have avoided proper publicity, that they have been
too ready to accept employer excuses and, most of all, that they have lacked
a sense of the importance of disposing of cases promptly. The almost com-
plete lack of employer criticism of the commissions tends to prove that
these complaints are valid. Industry is being nudged toward the light just
a little too gently. It will be interesting to see whether the new Ohio Com-
mission introduces a new note into the picture.
59 On the operation of the state commissions, see BERGER, EQUALITY BY STAT-
UTE, 109-169 (1952); Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination
Legislation-Experience under the New York Law against Discriminaion, 40
CORNELL L. Q. 40 (1954); Note, The Operation of State Fair Employment Prac-
tices Commissions, 68 HARV. L. REv. 685 (1955) ; An American Legal Dilemma-
Proof of Discrimination, 17 U. CHl. L. REv. 107 (1949) ; 56 YALE L.J., supra note
58; The Fair Employment Practices Act-Oregon, 32 ORE. L. REV. 177 (1953).
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